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The most inﬂuential theory of law in current analytic legal philosophy is legal positivism, which generally
understands law to be a kind of institution. The most inﬂuential theory of institutions in current analytic social
philosophy is that of John Searle. One would hope that the two theories are compatible, and in many ways
they certainly are. But one incompatibility that still needs ironing out involves the relation of the social rule
that undergirds the validity of any legal system (H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition) to Searle’s notion of codi-
ﬁcation: the idea that institutions need ofﬁcial declarations of their constitutive rules in order to enjoy the full
beneﬁts of institutions. The incompatibility arises from the fact that, in order to do its institutional work, the
basic validity rule must be codiﬁed in Searle’s sense—yet, given the particular role it has in legal positivism,
it may be impossible to codify in the Searlean sense. In this paper I develop the incompatibility in detail, con-
sider and reject consigning the basic validity rule to Searle’s “Background” capacities that support institu-
tional facts, and conclude that the best route to eliminating it while doing a minimum of damage to the two
theories is to make a slight emendation to Searle’s theory of institutions.
The most inﬂuential theory of law in current analytic legal philosophy is that of H.L.A.
Hart (1994).1 Hart and his followers understand law to be a kind of institution.2 The
most inﬂuential theory of institutions in current analytic social philosophy is that of John
Searle (1995, 2010).3 Hence, one would hope that the two theories are compatible in
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1 This is not to suggest that most analytic legal philosophers accept Hart’s theory in its entirety. But most
who consider themselves to be legal positivists consider it to be roughly correct in the elements that will
concern us most here.
2 A reviewer for this journal has suggested a distinction between institutions as organizations and institu-
tions as practices (this latter should be broadened to include the rules that govern those practices), saying
that law is an institution might be ambiguous between these two understandings of institutions. This can
be dealt with by noting, ﬁrstly, that the two understandings are intimately linked. Practices create and
sustain organizations; organizations are continuing frameworks for practices. Secondly, we can avoid con-
fusion by keeping in mind the distinction between law and the government organizations that create,
interpret, change, and sustain it. (On the compatibility of seeing law as an institution and a practice see
Ehrenberg 2018.)
3 While Searle does acknowledge that his usage of “institution” is technical (2005, 19), he does so in
order to exclude the sense of the term associated with large areas of human practices (like religion or
economics as such), described generally and without deontic implications. Furthermore, Searle’s fre-
quent use of legal examples shows that whatever sense in which the law is an institution is the sense
he is trying to capture.
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what they tell us. In many ways they certainly are.4 But some incompatibilities still need
ironing out.
One key feature of institutions is their ability to impose norms independently of the
beliefs and intentions of those subject to the norms (that is the very point of institutions)
(Searle 2010, 23, 85-86; Shapiro 2011, 210-11). Institutions are capable of creating new
reasons for action, perhaps even reasons independent of actors’ interests. By manipulating
incentives through sanctions and the possibility of public disapprobation, the law exem-
pliﬁes this by acting upon our subjective or motivating reasons.
But institutions also go further in purporting to impose new normative or objective
reasons on institutional members. The law is again a prime example. Legal institutions
like corporations seem to give rise to new reasons for action, perhaps even obligations to
act against our interests, even if we are otherwise reluctant to accede to any general obli-
gation to obey the law. A complete account of law, or of institutions more generally, then
owes us an explanation of how facts about certain special kinds of social interactions
give rise to these new norms.
One way of understanding Searle’s theory of institutional facts is as an attempt to
give such an explanation of how facts about institutions might create new norms.5 If
successful, this would be particularly valuable to legal positivists who follow Hart,
since by seeing law as a species of social fact, they are in need of an explanation of
how to get from fact to norm. In order for Searle’s theory to be useful in that way
for legal positivists, however, we would have to make sure what Searle tells us about
institutions is consistent with what legal positivists tell us about the law. This paper
is an initial step in that project by serving as an attempt to iron out one point of ten-
sion.6
A feature of legal systems, often noted by philosophers of law, is that they involve
norms that pick out which particular laws are legally valid under that legal system. A
law of one jurisdiction, is not necessarily legally valid in another, where the two juris-
dictions have different legal systems with different rules to tell us how to identify
which laws are valid. Similarly, if the legislature of one of these jurisdictions tried to
pass a law that was not in conformity with its own rules of validity, the putative law
would not (generally) be recognized as legally valid within that jurisdiction. Even if a
law is identically worded to one in another legal system (as frequently happens with
uniform codes adopted across multiple states in the U.S.), it needs to be adopted
according to the procedural rules of each jurisdiction to be valid in that particular juris-
diction. Of the legal theories that treat issues of legal validity, legal positivism goes
furthest in its emphasis on the socially constructed—institutional nature of law7 (and
4 An extended analysis of their points of compatibility can be found in Ehrenberg (2016).
5 The possibility of any normative demands being based on mere (non-normative) facts is, of course, a
huge matter of contention in the philosophy of value, with Hume claiming this is impossible. It is a ques-
tion on which Searle has been attempting to shed light for quite some time. See Searle (1964). I make no
comment on the success of those attempts. But even if normative demands cannot be based merely on
descriptive facts, facts are certainly relevant to directing them.
6 Neil MacCormick perhaps focused the most on the relation between theories of institutional facts like
Searle’s and of legal positivism such as Hart’s. Yet it is not clear that he appreciated the particular difﬁ-
culty raised in this paper as he did not consider the law itself to be an institution, considering instead
legal entities such as contracts and wills to be institutions of law (MacCormick, 1974, 105).
7 See Schauer (2005, 496).
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most aspires to an explanatory jurisprudence), again owing us an account of the gene-
sis of legal normativity.8
Contemporary legal positivists have argued that legal systems rely on some basic rule,
which settles the most basic questions of a jurisdiction’s validity conditions, a rule that
contains the most basic criteria of legality for that jurisdiction. For Hart and others who
follow his form of legal positivism, this is the “rule of recognition.”9 This basic rule is
what legal ofﬁcials follow when they uphold their jurisdiction’s most fundamental laws
and procedures in the application of existing laws and the generation of new ones.
According to Hart and those who follow his general lead, collective acceptance and
application of this basic validity rule by key ofﬁcials determines what counts as legally
binding within a given jurisdiction. Hence this rule helps to determine the content and
application of the jurisdiction’s legal norms, which are key institutional facts about the
legal system. The question, which Searle’s theory holds out the promise of answering, is
how to get from the fact of collective acceptance of the jurisdiction’s basic validity rule
on the part of key ofﬁcials, to the normativity of law—its apparently binding character
on the rest of us.10 This paper is aimed at aiding in that project by examining a speciﬁc
8 David Enoch has argued that there is no problem in accounting for the ability of law to create normative
reasons as it merely triggers pre-existing conditional reasons in basically the same way that a grocer rais-
ing the price of milk gives you a reason to buy less—by manipulating non-normative facts (2011, 4-5,
26-28, his example). One issue I take with his analysis is that it depends upon seeing contextually-bound
normative reasons as “imaginary” if they do not pass a moral test, as only morality gives “real” norma-
tive reasons. Ibid., claiming “machismo-honor practice” does not give one real reasons. It seems to me
that when one is engaged in a practice, one might get contextual reasons relating to that practice (reasons
from the point of view of the practice, an institution would be a prime example), even if the immorality
of that practice ultimately means those reasons are easily outweighed or vitiated. I wish to deny that these
contextual reasons are “imaginary,” although I don’t think that doing so commits me to a speciﬁc meta-
physical position about them or what is meant by calling them “real.” Enoch’s view would not allow a
distinction between a mistake made about the reasons the practice is imposing (e.g., that the machismo-
honor practice requires severe tickling of those who dishonor you) and a mistake made in what morality
ultimately requires. It also has the implication (unpalatable to me) that outweighed reasons cease to be
“real” reasons rather than reasons that no longer apply. Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco also points out (per-
haps even more germane to our discussion here) that Enoch’s description of the way that non-normative
facts trigger pre-existing conditional reasons still leaves mysterious the move from fact to triggered norm
(Rodriguez-Blanco, 2013, 22). Finally, even if all legal reason-giving is a triggering of pre-existing con-
ditional reasons, it would be nice to have an account of what might make plausible law’s apparent claim
to give reasons even to those justiﬁably not engaged in being law-abiding (assuming that those already
engaged in the project of being law-abiding get their reasons triggered as Enoch describes, and those not
justiﬁably disengaged from that project already have a “real” moral reason to engage with it).
9 Hart (1994, 94-110). For Hans Kelsen, this is the Grundnorm. (1967, 8). There are some differences
between Hart and Kelsen that are not immediately relevant here (for a quick analysis see Waldron, 2009,
332). In my exposition below I tend to follow Hart over Kelsen (although I will generally use the more
general and descriptive “basic validity rule” rather than the theory-speciﬁc and more technical “rule of
recognition”). Some of the reasoning for preferring Hart’s analysis to Kelsen’s is given by Marmor
(2006a, 348-53). Joseph Raz has argued that there can be multiple rules of recognition within a given
legal system (1975, 146-48). Scott Shapiro has argued that “the rule of recognition should be identiﬁed
with all of the norm-creating and norm-applying parts of [a] shared plan” of constitutional order (2009,
250, emphasis in original). One result of this view is that only a portion of the rule of recognition is con-
sidered ultimate. Ibid. The problems raised below apply just as easily to such possibilities, so I will write
as though there is a unitary basic validity rule for simplicity.
10 For another attempt to answer this question that does not focus as much on law’s institutional nature, see
Himma (2013).
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difﬁculty in harmonizing Searle’s theory with legal positivism and suggesting a possible
solution.
Searle relies upon the notion of “codiﬁcation” to explain how the validity of institu-
tional norms gets speciﬁed. That is, he uses it to explain what counts as a robust instance
of an institutional norm in formal institutions. The problem is that the basic validity rule
cannot be understood as a codiﬁed rule in Searle’s sense, yet it seems that it must be
understood as codiﬁed in order for it to do the work that legal positivists have given it.
This paper will develop the problem in some detail and conclude by suggesting a modiﬁ-
cation to Searle’s theory in order to harmonize the theories.
I begin with a sketch of Searle’s theory of institutional facts, just to situate his notion
of codiﬁcation within it. Then I move on to show the relationship between a legal sys-
tem’s basic validity rule and collective intentionality. Then I show how that interplay cre-
ates problems for the work that codiﬁcation is supposed to do in the creation of
institutional facts, especially in relation to deontic powers. This is where we see that the
basic validity rule cannot ﬁt within Searle’s theory as it stands. Finally, I locate the difﬁ-
culty within Searle’s account of codiﬁcation, dismiss a possible reply, and suggest an
emendation.
1. Codiﬁcation
Searle tells us that institutional facts are a subclass of social facts, which means that they
depend upon collective intent (1995, 26; 2010, 156).11 Some of these social facts are
about practices that are “codiﬁed,” which lends them the properties of an institution,
although uncodiﬁed, “informal” institutions are also possible (Searle 1995, 53). Codiﬁca-
tion is therefore Searle’s answer to the problem of validity: institutional facts get their
ofﬁcial status via codiﬁcation.12
Searle’s notion of codiﬁcation is more general than, but likely based upon, the more
narrow legal sense. He does not give a more precise explication, other than to note that
codiﬁcation involves some kind of formal declaration. In law, “codiﬁcation” is usually
understood to refer only to the legislation of a legal norm, or perhaps the administrative
enactment of a regulation. But it is clear from Searle’s usage that his notion would apply
equally well to legal norms imposed by judicial action in that they are similarly formal-
ized. I will use the term in Searle’s broad institutional sense even when talking about
laws or legal systems, although we should keep in mind that legal codiﬁcation is one
species of this broader notion.
For Searle, as for others, observer-relative social facts are distinguished from observer-
independent brute facts (Searle 1995, 27).13 The former are facts whose truth is deter-
mined by our social environment and hence dependent upon our behavior or recognition
in some way (although this does not threaten their epistemic objectivity, Searle 1995, 8-
12); the latter are facts about the world whose truth is independent of our understanding.
That an object is made out of wood and metal is a brute fact; that it is a hammer is a
social fact.
11
“[A] social fact is simply any case of collective intentionality involving two or more animals” (Smith &
Searle, 2003, 304).
12 See Hindriks (2003, 203-05).
13 See also MacCormick (1974, 103), distinguishing brute from institutional facts citing Searle (1969, 50-
53).
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In Searle’s theory, an institutional fact is created by the collectively intended assign-
ment of a status function (usually, “X counts as Y in context C”14) to something (usually
conceived as a practice, but it can be just about any social phenomenon) via a constitu-
tive rule (1995, 23-26, 40-45).15 The status function conveys deontic powers, which
“provide desire-independent reasons for action” (Searle 2010, 23). In other words, an
institutional fact reﬂects a certain kind of social activity that can take place over time by
creating, identifying, or changing rights and responsibilities among the participants. It is
created when we have a set of rules that constitutes the activity by imposing a status
upon the behavior or related objects or events.
While Searle claims constitutive rules create the possibility for the activity and thereby
differ from rules that simply regulate the activity (1995, 27),16 Joseph Raz has persua-
sively argued that all rules are both constitutive and regulative in Searle’s sense, depend-
ing on the descriptions one gives of the behaviors performed in conforming to the rule
(Raz 1975, 108-11). Any distinction that can be maintained would therefore attach to the
functions that the rules perform, the descriptions we give of them, and the behaviors we
perform in following them. Using this distinction therefore doesn’t suggest that there are
two different types of rules; it only calls attention to the way a given rule is operating in
a speciﬁc context. While Raz sees this as a good reason for preferring the notion of
“power-conferring rules” (1975, 111, following Hart), we will stick with Searle’s termi-
nology for simplicity of analysis, keeping in mind that it should refer to a description of
a rule’s use, rather than a distinct type of rule.17
While only facts about objects, practices, or events assigned functional statuses they
could not otherwise have had are candidates for institutional facts (Searle 1995, 88-89),
that imposition of function also must be collectively intended (in a speciﬁcally empow-
ered context).18 Otherwise I could create a new institutional fact simply by looking at my
pen and declaring it to be the scepter of power to be used in all ofﬁcial state cere-
monies.19
14 (1995, 28). Conformity with this formula is not absolutely necessary. It serves as a “mnemonic to remind
us that institutional facts” require a collectively intended assignment of a special status to the object
(Smith & Searle, 2003, 301). See also Searle (2010, 19-20).
15 See also Smith and Searle (2003, 302-03), discussing the reasons for not limiting the recipients of status
functions to objects.
16 Both Searle and Hart understood that constitutive rules can also regulate the activity. See Searle (1969,
33-34), cited by Marmor (2006a, 350, interpreting Hart).
17 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for alerting me to the need for this clariﬁcation.
18 We collectively intend for the practice or object to take on a special functional status. Our intention is
collective in that we collectively impose the function on the object and we intend (or recognize, Searle,
2010, 56-57) that object to fulﬁll the function we impose upon it, (Searle, 1995, 23-26; 2010, 59-60).
For criticism of Searle’s reliance on collective intentionality as the backbone of his theory of institutions
see Turner (1999, 223-29). I will go into greater detail about Searle’s notion of collective intentionality
below. For now, it is enough to understand that his notion of collective intentionality is one in which
each individual possesses an intention that is identical to those of the others in the group, and that the
intention is irreducibly collective in that its content references the group (Searle, 1995, 23-26; see also
2010, 47-48). It should also be noted that Searle avoids any metaphysically mysterious, Hegelian-style
notions of collectivity here. The intentions are held by individuals; their content is collective (1995, 25).
See also Zaibert (2003, 62-63, noting the inadequacy of Searle’s treatment).
19 In this, institutional facts as understood by Searle differ from works of art and many other kinds of arti-
facts that we would not consider to be institutionally deﬁned. In many of those other cases, the individual
intention of a single creator may be enough for status facts about the object to be made true.
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The imposition or assignment of function20 is simply the use of an object to fulﬁll a
purpose.21 An important subset of these assigned functions is symbolic, in which the
ascribed function is to “stand for” or “represent” something else (Searle 1995, 21).22 Fur-
thermore, these assignments can be unconscious, even while they must be intentional
(and hence at least capable of being understood) (Searle 1995, 21-22). Since it requires
collective intentionality, we can call the creation of an institutional fact a collective impo-
sition of function.
The imposition of status functions takes two forms. In one form, collective intention
attributes the function to the recipients individually. This is true for cocktail parties
(Searle’s example). Generally, we are only at a cocktail party when most of the people at
the gathering consider it to be a cocktail party. It is not that they must think, “This is a
cocktail party.” Rather, they must treat the activity in which they are engaging as a cock-
tail party and thereby collectively attribute the cocktail party function to the activity.23 In
the other form, our collective intention attributes the function to the recipients as a type.
This is true for money (again, Searle’s example). A given piece of paper or metal counts
as money because it ﬁts a certain description and the status of money has been conferred
upon anything that ﬁts that description (although this need not be conferred by law). So,
in the former case the ‘X’ term in the “X counts as Y in context C” formula is a particu-
lar instance, while in the latter it is a description that can ﬁt multiple possible tokens. In
the latter case, then, there must be something that ﬁxes the type and determines how to
recognize tokens as instances of the type, bearing its status function. This is done through
codiﬁcation.
Codiﬁcation is therefore a formalized process of declaration for attaching or creating
statuses. (This is the closest we can get to a deﬁnition based on Searle’s treatment. While
I acknowledge that calling the process “formalized” may be almost as opaque as codiﬁca-
tion itself, the idea is that codiﬁcation happens by following some established rules or
procedures for making the status ascription.) Adding codiﬁcation moves us from token-
status ascriptions for informal institutions and social facts more generally, to type- status
ascriptions for formal institutional facts.24 This means that, where codiﬁcation is present,
the assignment of function in the constitutive rule “X counts as Y in context C” itself
becomes institutionalized. Each cocktail party must be collectively treated as a cocktail
20 Searle uses “imposition” and “assignment” of function interchangeably (1995, 13).
21 Ibid., distinguishing “imposed,” “agentive” functions from “discovered,” “non-agentive” functions (also
2010, 58-59). See also Fotion (2000, 179-80). In Searle’s words, it is the “ascription of . . . the use to
which we intentionally put these objects” (1995, 20, emphasis in original).
22 These are Searle’s use of the terms.
23 While Searle clearly states, “Part of being a cocktail party is being thought to be a cocktail party. . .”
(1995, 88-89), I believe a charitable understanding of his theory is that there must be a self-conscious
attribution of the function of a cocktail party to the event, not that anyone must think of the gathering as
a cocktail party in so many words. I will return to this point below.
24 More precisely, since the ascription of function deﬁnes the social or institutional entity, there is a self-
referentiality to that deﬁnitional process that would otherwise be circular. (To be a cocktail party is to be
treated as a cocktail party.) This process is saved from circularity because we bestow the name upon the
practice when we name the function, which is itself simply a “placeholder for the linguistic articulation
of all [the] practices” that comprise the function being ascribed. Whereas generally this self-referentiality
applies to each token of the practice (in that we ascribe the status function to each token individually),
codiﬁcation allows us to ascribe the status function to practices by types. Ibid.
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party in order to be a cocktail party, but a certain twenty dollar bill can still be a piece
of currency even if no one ever comes into contact with it.25
Searle states that the test for the presence of an institutional fact is whether the constitu-
tive rules imposing the status function could be codiﬁed explicitly (1995, 87-88). Where
that codiﬁcation is possible but has not yet been done, the institution is merely informal
(Searle 2010, 91; 1995, 88).26 Among other things, an informal institution lacks clear crite-
ria for identifying invalid instances or applications of the institution’s norms. (There are not
really any rules for what counts as a ‘real’ cocktail party and what does not.) Hence the use
of codiﬁcation to distinguish between formal and informal institutions is precisely what
allows for the presence of criteria of validity within the institution.
While Searle remains vague about how he conceives of codiﬁcation itself, claiming
only that to get type-level functional ascription, codiﬁcation must be “ofﬁcial” (employ-
ing the quotation marks: 1995, 53) and explicit,27 he clearly envisions legal enactments
as paradigm cases. We can put these notions together to suggest a more complete picture:
there will be a person or body empowered (by a constitutive rule of the institution) to
establish the assignment of function (within a given domain of discourse) as at least one
of its tasks.28 Furthermore, that person or body must issue a symbolic representation of
the codiﬁcation, usually by reducing it to words. Of course, we will need other institu-
tional facts below these to pick out what is “ofﬁcial” (which gives rise to the problem
addressed in this paper).
We cannot expect clear necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for Searlean codiﬁcation as
there is no “sharp dividing line between social facts in general and the special subclass of
institutional facts” (Searle 1995, 88). However, more recently Searle has focused on the use
of a speciﬁc kind of speech-act, a “Declaration,” to create the institution.29 Hence, we can
extend the notion of codiﬁcation to include the need for an ofﬁcial declaration of some kind,
while uncodiﬁed, informal institutions can form without the need for declarations.30
Practices whose status functions remain uncodiﬁed have the advantages of “ﬂexibility,
spontaneity, and informality,” which are lost through codiﬁcation (Searle 1995, 88).31
25
“Codiﬁcation speciﬁes the features a token must have in order to be an instance of the type [where we
ascribe the status function to types rather than tokens].” Ibid.
26 In conversation, Searle conﬁrmed that he thought the difference between institutions and mere social facts
turns upon whether codiﬁcation of the status function is possible; where it is possible but has not yet
taken place, the institution is informal.
27 Contrast this with the notion of codiﬁcation employed by David Lewis (1969, 104, explaining that the
rules of a game are codiﬁed when written down and such codiﬁcations can be used to teach the game).
28 This empowerment itself will usually be the result of an earlier codiﬁcation. Additionally, the person
could be artiﬁcial and the body could be the entire community.
29 Searle (2010, 85-86, capitalizing “Declaration” to indicate that it is a characteristic kind of speech act).
This focus is meant to help explain the possibility of institutions that are not mapped onto pre-existing
entities (so called “free standing Y-terms” in which there is no X in the “X counts as Y in context C”
formula, 2008, 454; Smith 2003, 19-25).
30 In some cases, there can even be institutional facts without institutions. Searle’s example of this is a line
of stones (the remains of an ancient wall) that continues to be treated as a boundary (2010, 94-95).
31 Andrei Marmor has distinguished between two kinds of codiﬁcation: “Legislative codiﬁcation of rules
purports to determine, authoritatively, what the rules are. In contrast, encyclopedic codiﬁcation only pur-
ports to report what the rules are, without actually determining their content for the future” (2007, 607).
The phrase quoted in the text and other passages of Searle’s (see e.g., infra, n. 33) make it clear that his
notion of codiﬁcation corresponds most closely to Marmor’s legislative form.
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Hence codiﬁcation involves some notion of ﬁxity that entails the loss of these
characteristics.
We can get some insight into this aspect of codiﬁcation by comparing Searle’s analy-
sis to Hart’s notion of the difference between a “primitive” or “customary” legal system
and a “modern” legal system. The primitive system consists only of what Hart calls “pri-
mary” rules, which correspond to what Searle would call merely regulative rules (of
course, the wider, non-legal context will have many constitutive rules and keeping in
mind that we have rejected any sharp distinction here). The modern system includes “sec-
ondary” rules to constitute the legal institutions and ofﬁces, providing for ofﬁcial codiﬁ-
cation. The customary system suffers from the defects of “uncertainty” about the precise
meaning or application of the rules, the “static” nature of the rules in a system that does
not have any institutional procedures for their intentional change, and the “inefﬁciency”
of having no institutions to enforce them (Hart 1994, 92-93). While they are not dealing
with the precisely the same subject matter (legal systems for Hart, formal versus informal
institutions for Searle), the mark of the development of the “modern” legal system is pre-
cisely a set of “secondary” rules that provide for ofﬁcial codiﬁcation.32
While Searle notes that there is no bright line distinction between social facts gener-
ally and institutional facts, he also claims, “The characteristic institutional move, how-
ever, is that form of collective intentionality that constitutes the acceptance, recognition,
etc., of one phenomenon as a phenomenon of a higher sort by imposing a collective sta-
tus and a corresponding function upon it” (1995, 88). The example of cocktail parties
might bring this process further into the light. Initially, cocktail parties were simple social
facts. People came together to drink alcohol and engage in witty banter, without thinking
anything special of it or attaching to it any special statuses, rights, or duties. They did so
intentionally in the sense that they intended to drink alcohol and engage in witty banter
at a gathering of people, and that required a similar intention on the part of others. But
they did not necessarily consider it a special event to do so. Many, perhaps even most,
cocktail parties are still like this, especially those that seem more to be cocktail parties in
retrospect than in the planning. Other cocktail parties are special events in the sense that
hosts decide to throw a cocktail party: they send out invitations in which they request
replies. People who receive the invitations know that they are invited to a cocktail party,
and that it is incumbent upon them to reply. If they attend, they do so knowing what to
expect when they get there: that the hosts will provide a certain atmosphere and some
alcohol. These special events have risen to the level of informal institutions. At this
point, there is much more self-consciousness about the cocktail party. It does not rise to
the informal institutional level of the special event unless people consider it as such and
engage in “the acceptance, recognition, etc., of one phenomenon as a phenomenon of a
higher sort by imposing a collective status and a corresponding function upon it.” Searle
also invites us to imagine what it would take for cocktail parties to rise to the level of a
formal institution (1995, 88). Some ofﬁcial body would have to codify rules specifying
which gatherings are to be considered cocktail parties, and what the rights and
32 Their apparent differences over the advantages and disadvantages of a fully developed institutional sys-
tem can be harmonized somewhat by looking at the perspectives from which purposive enactment might
be a strength or a weakness. A fully developed legal system is less static than a system of entrenched
customs because it provides for purposive change. But it is also less ﬂexible than a system relying on
token recognition of statuses because it requires following an institutionalized procedure for change.
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responsibilities are of hosts and invitees.33 The mark of what makes it pass from an
informal to a formal institution is thus whether its rules are codiﬁed such that we can say
which instances are valid instances of the kind and which (if any) are merely
counterfeits.
2. The Basic Validity Rule and Collective Intention
The problem arises when we get to the most basic constitutive rule that identiﬁes which
codiﬁcations are valid. Codiﬁcation in complex institutions is iterative (Searle, 1995, 80f,
116). The only reason that a piece of currency is money is that there is a codiﬁcation of
the appropriate assignment of function. The only reason that codiﬁcation is itself legally
effective is the codiﬁcation of another institutional fact lying behind or underneath it,
something of the general form “statements written in these books (or spoken by these
people) count as legally binding when passed according to the rules listed in this founda-
tional document.”34 On these points Searle and most legal positivists would agree.
Notions of legal validity are similarly dependent on more basic constitutive rules, which
in turn are dependent on still more basic rules (Hart 1994, 107). But Searle’s framework
does not give us an adequate way to account for the most basic validity rule.
The most basic rule directing legal ofﬁcials how to recognize valid laws cannot itself
be recorded as a law within the legal system it validates (Shapiro 2011, 86).35 If we were
to try to legislate or legally codify the basic validity rule, we would need to have another
– even more basic – rule telling us to recognize the legal validity of the rule we just tried
to legislate. And that rule would then take its place as the basic validity rule. Further-
more, since it is an ultimate rule, it is not dependent on others for validity; questions
about its legal validity are misplaced since it is constitutive of legal validity (Hart 1994,
109; Shapiro 2011, 90; Coleman 2011, 8 n.7; Coyle 2006, 420). It cannot be formulated
33 While it is possible to envision informal institutions, once formal codiﬁcation takes place, specifying the
characteristics a token must have to be a member of the type, informal institutional examples are no
longer possible for that entity (or are at best counterfeit instances of it), although they still might exist as
simple social facts. Searle’s example of the Korean War shows the unavailability of informal institutions
when codiﬁcation is present (1995, 89). American ofﬁcials were very anxious that it be called a “UN
Police Action,” so as to avoid the risk that the military action would be found unconstitutional. It was
still a war in the basic social fact sense (and so it is not incorrect to call it a war), but it was not a war
in the institutional sense. Given this analysis of Searle’s, we cannot say that the Korean War was an
informal institutional fact. Its status as a war was studiously and purposely not made an institutional fact,
and was purposely left simply a social fact. (It might still have been an instance of a different kind of
institution as well: a “Police Action.”) While the example of the Korean War invites us to imagine codiﬁ-
cation in terms of its legal paradigm of legislation, we should remember that Searle’s notion is much
broader than legal enactment. We can also see examples of this sort in sports and religious rituals, where
a token performance can fail to be a member of the ‘ofﬁcially recognized’ type because of a ﬂaw in its
pedigree or execution. Hence codiﬁcation, in specifying what features a token must have to be a valid
member of the type, sets forth standards of validity that would exclude “informal” exemplars as counter-
feit (Hindriks 2003, 203-05).
34 This is not meant to be a quotation from a legal instrument. The basic validity rules are generally under-
stood to be customary (or practice-theory) rules. They are not generally thought to be reducible to a legal
formula and recorded as law since they would require a further more basic rule to enable that recording
to serve as legally valid (and hence there would need to be another more basic rule below). See Hart
(1994, 111), Alexander and Schauer (2009), and as discussed immediately below. See also e.g., Coleman
(2011, 8 n.7), Coyle (2006, 420), both citing Hart (1994, 109, claiming that questions of validity cannot
arise about the rule of recognition itself).
35 See also e.g., Greenawalt (1987, 622), reprinted in Adler and Himma (2009, 2).
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as a law within the legal system precisely because it is the rule that determines what
counts as law in that system.36 Its existence is a matter of fact inherent in the practices
of ofﬁcials (and sometimes citizens as well),37 which reﬂect their acceptance of it.
According to Hart, the rule of recognition is not even usually stated explicitly (1994,
107).
Clearly, this means that the basic validity rule cannot be codiﬁed in the legal sense.
But it also raises a problem in Searle’s broader sense of codiﬁcation. The way the basic
validity rule sits outside the set of laws it validates means it does not ﬁt into Searle’s
analysis: it is the constitutive rule of ofﬁcial (Searlean) codiﬁcation for legal institutions,
specifying which legal enactments “count as” ofﬁcially codiﬁed in that jurisdiction.38
The behavior of legal ofﬁcials with respect to their determinations of legal validity is
both rule-described and rule-governed (or guided) (Searle 1995, 139; Shapiro 1998).39
The content of the rule is a description of criteria legal ofﬁcials use to determine which
laws are valid within their system. But it also serves as a reason for those ofﬁcials to use
those criteria where they are either motivated or have good reason to do as other ofﬁcials
are doing. Their authority is a mutually supporting network of recognition under the
basic validity rule.40
The idea of accepting a description of the behavior of ofﬁcials as a reason for them to
behave in accordance with the criteria exempliﬁed by that behavior reﬂects the character-
istic transformation of a social fact into an institutional one under Searle. The description
of their behavior now has a new status that includes the creation of deontic powers, at
least from the institutional point of view (Searle 1995, 100-01; 2010, 92, 105-06, 118,
167): ofﬁcials are institutionally obligated to act in conformity with the basic validity
rule. (Whether this institutional obligation is a moral one depends upon the wider moral
36 Scott Shapiro notes that there is a sense in which the rule of recognition is a rule of the system it vali-
dates, but it is not a law of the system it validates. “[T]he law of a particular system just is the set of
rules that ofﬁcials of a certain system are under a duty to apply and the rule of recognition sets out the
content of this duty” (Shapiro 2009, 240; 2011, 85 (this passage is emphasized in the texts), and citing
Raz 1979, 92).
37 Hart (1994, 101-02, 107-10, 256). See also Dickson (2007, 11). As I discuss below, this statement is not
intended to endorse Hart’s practice theory explanation of the basic validity rule.
38 One might think that the U.S. Constitution speciﬁes the content of the basic validity rule for United
States law, and that the Constitution was ratiﬁed according to an ofﬁcial process and hence codiﬁed in
Searle’s sense. There are several problems with this objection. For one, following Hart’s analysis, it is
more correct to say that the rule of recognition for the U.S. is something like, ‘whatever rules are adopted
and applied according to, and are consistent with, the rules set forth in the U.S. Constitution’ (see 1994,
107.) That is, since the Constitution is the “supreme law of the land,” there must be an additional rule
(which is itself not a law) that ofﬁcials are following to treat the Constitution as the supreme law. Sha-
piro articulates another problem with seeing the Constitution as setting out the content of the rule of
recognition: he claims that the rule of recognition is a duty-imposing (although still secondary) rule,
while the Constitution is mostly power-conferring (2011, 85-86). See also generally Greenawalt (1987),
reprinted in Adler and Himma (2009).
39 We will see below that this is why Searle cannot accommodate the basic validity rule in his “Back-
ground” capacities (1995, 145).
40 Shapiro criticizes Hart’s “practice theory” description of the basic validity rule as a category mistake,
claiming rules are abstract entities, while practices are spatially and temporally located (Shapiro, 2011,
103). This argument has received its share of criticism (e.g., Sciaraffa 2011, 610; Gardner and Macklem
2011; Kramer 2013, 380-83; see also Green 2013; offering a qualiﬁed defense). I sidestep this issue here
by focusing on the basic validity rule’s normative nature without taking a position on from where that
normativity is properly derived. I address this issue more directly and offer my own reply to Shapiro on
this issue in Ehrenberg (2018).
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legitimacy of the institution). It is this characteristic that requires us to see the basic
validity rule as more than a simple social fact. Yet it does not ﬁt within Searle’s frame-
work to describe its institutional nature, neither as an informal institutional fact, nor as a
formal one. It would be a requirement within Searle’s theory for the basic validity rule to
be codiﬁed, and yet it is impossible to do so because of its special characteristics.41
The reliance of legal positivists upon the acceptance of the basic validity rule as the
cornerstone of a legal system mirrors Searle’s analysis that legal systems depend on col-
lective acceptance rather than force (2010, 163, 165).42 One might think that since the
rule itself depends for its existence only on the acceptance of certain key ofﬁcials, it does
not depend upon a broader collective intentionality. This would seem to run afoul of
Searle’s claim that the collective who must accept the institution consists of those who
are members of or subject to the institution. The idea might be that since the basic valid-
ity rule only requires a relatively small number of key ofﬁcials to follow it, it is not an
object of society-wide collective intentionality. In the case of the institution of law,
everyone in society is subject to the institution and yet only the key ofﬁcials need accept
the basic validity rule.
This is not the case for two reasons: First of all, the rest of the populace tend to defer
to those ofﬁcials in the determination of legal validity. This is analogous to a linguistic
or epistemic division of labor. We rely on scientiﬁc experts to determine the atomic
structure of gold, allowing us to rely on their expertise (or that of others familiar with
the scientiﬁc markers) to decide for us which references to or exemplars of gold are cor-
rect and which are really just iron pyrite.43 Similarly, we rely on legal experts (ofﬁcials)
to determine which putative legal rules are valid under our legal system.44
Secondly (and this bears some emphasis), it is not necessary for the collective that
possesses the relevant intention to be identical with the collective to which the institution
is meant to apply. If there is a splinter group off in the woods claiming that the govern-
ment is illegitimate because of some perceived inconsistency between the details of its
formation and the procedures found in foundational texts, we do not immediately say that
the government’s legitimacy is a subjective matter. That the key ofﬁcials accept the
41 While related, the problem we are focused on in this paper is not the same as the chicken-egg problem
discussed by Shapiro (2011, 40-41). That is the problem of who authorized the rule makers to make the
rule specifying who is authorized to make rules (although put in terms of legal norms). Hart’s rule of
recognition can be seen as a solution to that problem, saying essentially that a customary (practice-theory)
rule provides the mutually supporting network of recognition necessary to establish the authorization to
make and interpret legal rules (although Shapiro attacks Hart for offering this solution – see previous
footnote for details). While that is a general problem of authority in formal contexts, our problem is one
in the ontology of social institutions: how an informal, customary rule can provide the ﬁxity needed for
the validity standards required in formal institutions.
42 Searle offers the Los Angeles riots of 1992 and the response of police, who were unable to exercise
authority once the number of law breakers grew too large, as evidence of this point (1995, 90-91). This
is almost identical to Hart’s point that for legal force to be applied against anyone within a jurisdiction,
there must already be widespread acceptance of the legal authority (1994, 201). See also Shapiro (2009,
251), detailing the need for trust in legal ofﬁcials for a legal system to operate.
43 I purposely avoid here the question of whether the reference is correct only because the experts (of the
linguistic community) say so, or if they say so only because it is correct. The point is that the linguistic
community relies on experts in either case.
44 Admittedly, in the case of scientiﬁc experts, their expertise is entirely epistemic, while for legal ofﬁcials
some or much of their expertise is constitutive of the content of law. (They may be ‘experts’ only in the
sense that the institution assigns this role to them, or because they had a role in the formation of the
law.) But this distinction does not threaten the analogy made here.
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legitimacy of the government is enough to make it so (by its own lights) since the insti-
tution itself gives them the power to make the determination, and that institution is sup-
ported by at least the tacit acceptance of the populace.45 This is not to say that the
splinter group does not have a valid point, only that the legal legitimacy of the legal sys-
tem is not a subjective matter simply because some people disagree.
This is similar to the decision of a referee in certain sporting events. Her determination
about a disputed play sufﬁces for the ofﬁcial record of the game, regardless of what play-
ers or spectators might think. This is not to say that the referee is infallible. Players or
spectators who are familiar with the rules might dispute her determination on the basis of
their own perception and interpretation of events. But they cannot reasonably dispute that
the referee is given the power to make the ﬁnal determination of the play’s ofﬁcial status
within the game. Of course, the referee is just one individual, so there must be a network
of collective intentionality that puts her in that position and gives her the power to make
the ofﬁcial determination.
The basic validity rule is necessarily an object of collective intentionality. Key legal
ofﬁcials must operate with the same rule in order to have a coherent legal system;46 they
follow the rule because it is the rule that the group accepts (although they may also have
other reasons upon which they rely,47 and they need not be fully psychologically self-
aware in their use of the rule). The motivation for the ofﬁcials’ acceptance might be per-
sonal, but the content of the intention they have in doing so is collective: ‘We intend that
rules that meet these criteria will be our law’ (although, again, this is not necessarily con-
sciously explicit).
While there are several different understandings of collective intentionality in the liter-
ature, I do not believe much turns here on which kind of collective intentionality is cor-
rect, so long as it allows for the kind of implicit or un-self-conscious sharing of
intentionality that both legal positivists and Searle see as prevalent in legal institutions.48
Searle’s notion of “we-intentionality,” in which the content of each individual’s intention
is identical to that of each other individual (1995, 24-26; 2010, 47-48),49 has the advan-
tage of streamlining coherence among the ofﬁcials about the validity rule since it would
then be possible for their intentions regarding it to be identical.
Another advantage is that it places the interdependence and group reliance of the basic
validity rule in sharp relief, highlighting the need for coherence. While it would be possi-
ble for a given ofﬁcial to be wrong about the content of the intention, the fact that it is
45 See e.g., Himma (2001, 289), noting that the rule of recognition does not bind ordinary citizens since it
is not aimed at them, and Shapiro (2011, 85).
46 But see Dworkin (1986, 122), and Adler (2006, 745-47). While these views raise doubts about the shared
content of the basic validity rule, they do not necessarily threaten its status as an object of collective
intention. See Shapiro (2009, 260-61), showing that these views do not threaten the reliance of the rule
of recognition on shared plans.
47 Contra Dickson (2007, 22-23), who argues that the basic validity rule cannot be a Lewisian convention
(partially) because those who follow the rule do not generally do so simply because others do so (thereby
disqualifying it from being a convention in Lewis’ sense), see Postema (1982, 177-78), arguing that one
may have his own, nonconventional, reasons for accepting a Lewisian convention. See also Marmor
(2001, 199-203).
48 Searle does note that unconscious intentional states must, at least in principle, be accessible to conscious-
ness (1995, 7).
49 Criticism of notions of collective intentionality that do not reduce it to individual intentionality can be
found in Bratman (1999, 93-161).
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even possible to be wrong supports the notion that the intention held by the vast majority
of the ofﬁcials is identical or nearly so. While some disagreements among ofﬁcials as to
what counts as valid law are inevitable, the nature of the legal system itself requires that
these disagreements be resolved by treating disfavored decisions as mistaken applications
of the validity criteria.50 Each ofﬁcial is tracking the validity practices of the others with
the understanding that incorrect applications of the criteria represented by those practices
will be rejected as invalid. Hence the collective intent is to have a uniform set of prac-
tices that is then viewed as normative by those ofﬁcials.
3. Problems in Formalizing the Assignment of Function
The key move in codiﬁcation for Searle is the formalization of the assignment of func-
tion. What makes a social fact an institutional fact is that the constitutive rule assigning
the status function could be codiﬁed “explicitly” (Searle 1995, 88). (Again, where the sta-
tus function is not yet codiﬁed, but could be, the institution is only informal.) For Searle
explicitness is a necessary component of codiﬁcation. As mentioned above, codiﬁcation
removes the ﬂexibility, informality and spontaneity of social practices by formally record-
ing the constitutive rule.
The characteristics associated with uncodiﬁed social facts are ones we neither want nor
expect to see in the foundational norm that our ofﬁcials use to decide what counts as valid
law. We want and expect our basic validity rule to be relatively stable and deﬁnite. Cocktail
parties can arise informally and spontaneously. If one or two or even more of the attendees
happen not to think of it that way or think that they are all at a different kind of social gath-
ering, it does not much matter. But if many key legal ofﬁcials have very different ideas
about what makes any putative law a valid legal requirement in their jurisdiction, then the
legal institutions themselves are thrown into doubt (Hart 1994, 122, 148).
Of course, there may be some disagreement over interpretation of the basic rule or of
intermediary facts upon which the validity of other laws are based (such as the meaning
of constitutional terms).51 But if the assignment of function itself is not relatively rigid,
then we will have a much more radical difference of opinion among ofﬁcials as to what
counts as law.52 We might not be able to tell when we are married, or divorced, or con-
tractually obligated because we would not be able to tell which explicitly legally codiﬁed
enactments are ofﬁcially valid.
The law would not then be able to fulﬁll its Searlean codiﬁcation purpose in formaliz-
ing institutional facts, nor would it be very good at guiding behavior. If a lack of codiﬁ-
cation of the basic validity rule means that the law cannot fulﬁll any of its main social
functions, then it would seem that Searlean codiﬁcation of the basic rule is a necessary
step in the development of a legal system.53
50 Of course, where “mistaken” decisions come to be accepted we might say that the accepted validity crite-
ria have been changed.
51 Shapiro’s planning theory of law highlights the importance of this caveat (2009, 265-66, showing how
accounting for differences in interpretive methodology allows for disagreements regarding the criteria of
legal validity). See also above n.9 and ibid. (noting that a portion of the rule of recognition will still be
ultimate).
52 For an antipositivist like Dworkin (who does not believe in an absolute rule of validity), this distinction
may be one more of degree than of kind. (1986, 91). See also Marmor (2001, 197-98).
53 Remember that this is not meant to suggest a legal recording, which is conceptually impossible since the
basic validity rule cannot be understood to be legally valid or invalid.
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This is the surprising thing about the basic validity rule when viewed through a Sear-
lean lens: “Its informality does not make the entire legal system as evanescent as a cock-
tail party.”54 The explicit laws of the legal system are codiﬁed (in both senses), relatively
stable and deﬁnite. But they are based on an uncodiﬁable informality. They are legally
valid (and therefore “ofﬁcially codiﬁed,” with a successful assignment of their status
function) only if they conform to that informal basic validity rule. Under Searle’s analy-
sis, the fact that the basic validity rule is not codiﬁed should make the entire legal system
“as evanescent as a cocktail party,” but it does not.
To be clear, the content of the basic validity rule is undoubtedly an institutional fact.
It is still an object of collective intent and sets the criteria for the correct or successful
assignment of function, imposing the status of law on those legal enactments within its
ambit. It is still a description of social practices counted by ofﬁcials as a reason to con-
form to those practices. It makes the characteristic institutional move of creating deontic
powers by specifying the validating roles of certain key ofﬁcials. The problem is that, for
it to do its job properly, it both must be and cannot be codiﬁed.
Recall that codiﬁcation is the way to get an institutional fact to move from token-level
status ascription to type-level status ascription. Without codiﬁcation, each basic validity
rule must be considered to be such a rule in order to be one.
This might not look like much of a problem. After all, basic validity rules are proba-
bly more like cocktail parties. We consider each token basic validity rule in its capacity
to fulﬁll its functional role of setting the validity standards for the legal system it vali-
dates. Each legal system has its own basic validity rule and the ofﬁcials of each of those
systems must consider it as a token in its role. Ofﬁcials within each system consider a
given set of facts (e.g., that a piece of legislation was passed by the relevant majority
and signed by the executive) to set the validity conditions for their system. So those ofﬁ-
cials are treating the basic validity rule at the token-level as conferring legal status on the
enactments it calls upon them to identify as such.
However, Hart and other theorists explicitly acknowledge that these rules are not
something that ofﬁcials are psychologically self-aware about when they accept them.
They do not think to themselves, “I am following a basic rule that tells me to look to the
U.S. Constitution and decisions of the Supreme Court to make validity determinations,”
although they are self-conscious about applying the rule (Hart 1994, 107-08, noting that
the rule of recognition is an external fact about the legal system).
For clarity and ease of discussion, let us make a distinction here between a “self-con-
scious” endorsement and application of a rule, and one that is “self-aware.” (I am using
these terms in a special way here and don’t intend any implication that these are reﬂec-
tive of usage in psychological literature.) An ofﬁcial’s determination of validity in accord
with the basic validity rule is “self-conscious” in the sense that she knows that she is
applying rules to which she has access and thereby making a determination of validity.
But it is not generally “self-aware” in the sense that she is not usually psychologically
aware she is following an unwritten basic validity rule. She perhaps thinks instead she is
simply following the foundational document or practice. Another way of putting this
would be to say that one self-consciously applies a rule when one intentionally performs
the actions (or forms the beliefs) that the rule directs, while one is self-aware when one
has psychological access to the semantic content of the rule. That one can apply a rule
54 This way of putting the point is thanks to a blind reviewer.
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without being fully aware of its content should not be too surprising, as many instances
of etiquette are likely of this kind: an awareness that the behavior is demanded in that sit-
uation, but rarely aware of the exact content of the rule one is following.
The distinction I make here could be seen as a simpliﬁcation of a pair of more compli-
cated ones advanced by Gerald Postema. He makes two distinctions that cut across one
another. The ﬁrst is the distinction between “personal” and “logical” perspectives or
points of view. The personal is understood as “psychological or epistemic ‘sets’” belong-
ing to actual or imagined people. The logical is a way of describing “regions of logical
space.” He refers to these as “distinctive frameworks for inquiry.” The second is the dis-
tinction between the “theoretical” and “practical” domains of inquiry, the ﬁrst being
occupied with discovering what is the case, the latter occupied by what to do about it
(Postema 1998, 342). The distinction I draw is meant to capture the difference between
the theoretical and practical domains of inquiry within the personal perspectives of the
ofﬁcials. Since ofﬁcials are occupied with the practical domain of applying the basic
validity rule, they generally have no need to attend to the theoretical descriptions of those
practices.
Ofﬁcials are unlikely to think of themselves as discovering the criteria of legal validity
in an unwritten rule unless they happen to have read Hart or other legal philosophers.55
Rather, they are likely to think that the foundational document or practice is the most
basic rule. They use the basic validity rule to make explicit and conscious determinations
of legal validity; they are just not usually aware they are using an unwritten basic rule to
do so.
4. An Insufﬁciently Explicit Intention
We expect some explicit collective intention to codify the basic rule in order to lend it
its institutionality. But the possibility of this for the basic validity rule is undermined by
Searle and legal positivists’ point of agreement that institutions are based on social facts.
For Searle, any social object “is just the continuous possibility of the activity” (1995, 36)
that lies behind the object. Institutions, as kinds of social objects, do this by articulating
the normative contours of what actions meet the criteria of membership to be counted as
exemplars of that practice or activity. This echoes the notion shared by some positivists
that the basic validity rules are really just a description of shared practices among the
legal ofﬁcials, a description of what the group of ofﬁcials takes to be valid that they
internally adopt as reasons for conforming their validity decisions to those descriptions.56
55 This qualiﬁcation explains why I say that ofﬁcials do not generally have access to a formulation of the
basic validity rule even as they follow and implement it (although it has recently become apparent to me
that this may not be true in the UK, where judges routinely cite Hart in their opinions). It might seem
that the problem raised in this paper would be moot if legal ofﬁcials were all legal positivists. But the
problem is conceptual in that we have legal systems in which ofﬁcials are not knowledgeable about posi-
tivism and yet they still function as ofﬁcials (implying that such a situation is possible). Both Hart and
Searle purport to explain those systems and yet ofﬁcials are not generally self-aware of the basic validity
rule. Furthermore, even if it were the case that some ofﬁcials in every existing legal system are self-aware
(itself a great stretch to the imagination), the institutionality of the system depends upon many ofﬁcials
who are not self-aware.
56 See, e.g., Hart (1994, 107-09). See also, Marmor (2006b, 3-4), emphasizing the conventionality of the
basic validity rule as a way of explaining its institutionality.
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For Searle’s analysis of institutional facts to hold of the basic validity rule, the ofﬁ-
cials would have to intend collectively that something like “passed in conformity with
our jurisdiction’s ofﬁcially recognized foundational document and/or practices” (appropri-
ately cashed out with more speciﬁcs) constitutes the basic validity rule for their jurisdic-
tion. But if this formula is in reality simply a description of a practice and not the
psychologically explicit object of anyone’s intention (although its application is inten-
tional), then it is difﬁcult to see how institutionalization of the basic validity rule is
possible.
Recall Searle’s claim that for a social fact to be institutional (at least informally), the
constitutive rule must be capable of explicit codiﬁcation. So we might consider it enough
that the above formula could be made explicit, even if not legally codiﬁed.
But then a more serious problem arises. We have seen that the formula is not usually
endorsed as such in a psychologically self-aware manner, but is rather a description that
theorists impart to the legal system as the practice of its ofﬁcials. These theorists are, of
course, explaining the system from an external point of view. The content of the basic
validity rule is not generally psychologically available to the ofﬁcials, even if it is a per-
fectly accurate description of what those ofﬁcials are doing. Hence this particular consti-
tutive rule is not capable of explicit codiﬁcation since those that do the codifying (the
ofﬁcials) do not generally have access to any formulation of the rule.
To summarize, there are three possible ways to understand the basic validity rule from
within Searle’s theory: 1) as a full-blooded institutional fact, 2) as an informal institu-
tional fact, and 3) as a simple social fact. Yet none of them seem open to us at the
moment.
(1) The basic rule cannot be a full-blooded institutional fact because there is no col-
lectively intended assignment of the status function. The “X” term in the “X
counts as Y in C” formula would be a description of the criteria legal ofﬁcials
use in making determinations of legal validity. The “Y” term would be the con-
version of this description into a reason-giving behavior-guiding rule. The “C”
term would be the legal jurisdiction in which those particular ofﬁcials operate.
(That context itself is a creation of the legal system and hence an institutional
fact.) The problem is that we have no constitutive rule assigning the status func-
tion to the description of the ofﬁcials’ behavior. We have good reasons to think
that the basic validity rule is an institutional fact; we just cannot use Searle’s
theory to explain it as such.
(2) The basic validity rule cannot be an “informal” institutional fact because we could
not codify the constitutive rule even if we could locate one, and the availability of
a rule that could be codiﬁed is a necessary characteristic of an informal institution.
(3) If, instead, we wish to say that the validity rule is a simple social fact, we run
back into the problem that we cannot then understand how a simple description
of ofﬁcials’ practices is creating reasons and guiding their behavior, since a sim-
ple uninstitutionalized social fact does not carry any deontic powers. The ofﬁ-
cials are certainly imposing a function on the description of each other’s validity
practices: they are treating those practices as reason-giving. So the basic validity
rule does not ﬁt any of Searle’s categories.
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We would not usually be bothered by the fact that ofﬁcials are not psychologically
self-aware when following a basic validity rule. Judges believe themselves bound by their
constitution to apply the relevant sources of law, not that they are following a more basic
rule that tells them to look to their constitution to ﬁnd the relevant sources. Much theo-
rizing about the world around us carries with it the implicit claim that people are engag-
ing in behaviors or holding beliefs without fully realizing their theoretical characteristics.
In Searle’s use of collective intentionality, however, we have a claim that (at least in
some cases) people must be aware of the status they collectively intend in their assign-
ment of function. Cocktail parties are not cocktail parties if we do not collectively intend
them to be cocktail parties. Pieces of paper cannot function as money if there aren’t at
least some ofﬁcials who collectively intend for them to be used as money. To give rise
to an institutional fact (even in an informal institution), we have to be sufﬁciently self-
aware of our ascription of functionality to the practices in which we are engaged. We
must at least be aware of treating the gathering as a cocktail party by self-consciously
behaving as we do at cocktail parties.
The problem we have been examining does not arise because the ofﬁcials fail to think
consciously of the basic validity rule as a basic validity rule. Rather, it arises because the
ofﬁcials do not generally have sufﬁcient intentionality to treat the description of their
validity practices as a rule for determining validity. To be sure, they follow the validity
rule because other ofﬁcials are doing so (if they have internalized it as reason-giving),
but they are not psychologically aware of giving it the status of a validity rule. For them
it continues to be a practice that they follow because others do so; there is no recognition
of the practice as counting as something else.
Searle would be the ﬁrst to remind us of the linguistic and institutional division of
labor. One might therefore think that the highest ranking legal ofﬁcials, who pass on
issues of validity, are relying on the expertise of philosophers in order to intend success-
fully and collectively that their basic norms ﬁx the criteria of legal validity for their legal
system. This cannot be a satisfactory answer. First of all, when we rely on the scientists
to do the background scientiﬁc work for us to speak more accurately about the world,
those scientists actually have to endorse the scientiﬁc propositions that lie behind our
statements. When philosophers talk about legal ofﬁcials accepting basic validity rules,
there is no sense in which the philosophers themselves are thereby accepting any particu-
lar rules as setting the standards for legal validity.57 Secondly, in the scientiﬁc context
there is an important self-consciousness about the limits of one’s knowledge and the reli-
ance on others to do the important theoretical work that is clearly lacking in the legal sit-
uation. The highest court in the land does not believe itself to be relying on the
theoretical work of philosophers in order to pick out successfully which laws are valid.
5. No Solution in the Background
The most natural response for a Searlean confronted by these problems is to say that ofﬁ-
cials’ dispositions to conform to the basic validity rule are a part of the “Background”58
capacities that support other institutional facts. Many of the points I have just noted about
57 See Hart’s distinction between internal and external claims about a legal system (1994, 102-03), his
remarks more generally on the nature of legal theory in the Postscript (ibid.), and generally Dickson
(2001). For criticism of this approach see generally Dworkin (2004).
58 Searle capitalizes the word to indicate that it has special meaning in his theory.
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the basic validity rule do seem to reﬂect precisely the characteristics of the Background
that Searle details: a disposition to behave in conformity with a constitutive rule, thereby
collectively imposing the status function upon that rule, without the normally requisite
mental representation of the rule. This would solve the problem of the ofﬁcials’ needing
to have the details of the basic validity rule in mind, or to be psychologically self-aware
when using the basic validity rule in making their validity determinations. There might
be some initial plausibility in this move since, as the most basic rule, the basic validity
rule is an enabling condition for the determination of all other legal institutions within
that system, precisely what we expect from Searle’s Background.
The Background is “the set of noninentional or preintentional capacities that enable
intentional states of function” (Searle 1995, 129). The Background explains how the con-
stitutive rules (deontic powers) of an institution can cause conforming behavior in partici-
pants without them being directly aware of those rules (Searle 2010, 130). While the
application of this idea is much broader in scope, Searle’s basic argument for it is linguis-
tic, relying on the fact that we can only understand many words or phrases with multiple
meanings and nuanced applications by relying on our possession of a Background network
of “knowledge about how the world works [and]. . . abilities for coping with [it]” (1995,
131). What is true of language (itself a very basic institution) is then true for intentional
states more generally. By enabling linguistic interpretation and conceptualization, the
Background “structures consciousness,” includes and interacts with our “motivational dis-
positions,” and results in standing dispositions toward given kinds of behavior (Searle
1995, 132-37). These dispositions are “skills and abilities that are . . . functionally equiva-
lent to the system of rules, without actually containing any representations or internaliza-
tions of those rules” (Searle 1995, 142).59 Instead, we are conditioned to behave in
conformity with the rules that constitute our social and institutional structures by the
responses of others. For Hart, what constitutes the evidence that a social norm is in place
(and, for practice theory rules, partially constitutes the norms themselves) are the public
responses of praise and blame (1994, 84). For Searle, these public responses condition the
individual into conformity and collective acceptance (1995, 144-45).
The clear similarities between Searle’s description of the Background and the legal
theorists’ explanations of the basic validity rule mean that this response is not to be
swept aside lightly. However, there are serious problems in consigning the basic validity
rule to Searle’s Background that would need to be answered. Recall the distinction
between saying that a behavior is rule-described and rule-governed. Any behavior that is
repeated over time and ﬁts a particular description is a candidate for being rule-described.
Habits are prime examples. Such rules do not themselves constitute reasons for the
behavior as they are simply non-normative descriptions of the behavior and its regularity.
The move to rule-governed behavior is precisely the point at which the rule itself pro-
vides a reason for the behavior. It is to see the rule as normative, calling for the behav-
ior.60
It is important for ofﬁcials’ conformity with the basic validity rule to be rule-governed
behavior. Legal ofﬁcials must treat the fact that other ofﬁcials conform their recognition
59 We will see that it is precisely this lack of “internalizations” of the rules that calls the Background into
question as an appropriate description for conformity to the basic validity rule by legal ofﬁcials.
60 The difﬁculty in explaining this move with respect to the rule of recognition as a practice theory rule is
the basis of much criticism of Hart’s theory. See, e.g., Shapiro (2011, 102-04).
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of valid law to the basic validity rule as a reason to do so themselves (albeit possibly
implicitly or subconsciously). In Hart’s theory: “This consists in the standing disposition
of individuals to take such patterns of conduct both as guides to their own future conduct
and as standards of criticism which may legitimate demands and various forms of pres-
sure for conformity” (1994, 255).61 It is all the more important for any theory that holds
the basic validity rule to be duty-imposing (Shapiro 2011, 85; Raz 1979, 92).
Hart shares Searle’s starting point that legal rules can be valid (and hence institutional
facts) when enacted and before anyone has occasion to conform to them.62 So when it
comes to enacted law, legal theory seems to agree with Searle’s analysis that institutional
facts take on a “life of their own.” However, for Hart, the basic validity rule is not such
an enacted rule. Rather, “a legal system’s basic rule of recognition is treated as a rule
constituted by the uniform practice of the courts in accepting it as a guide to their law-
applying and law-enforcing operations” (Hart 1994, 258). The basic validity rule is there-
fore for Hart a practice theory rule, its normative force arising from its acceptance.63
Even if we reject Hart’s practice theory account of the basic validity rule (perhaps for
leaving mysterious how we get from practice description to the normativity of a rule64),
it is at least clear that determinations of validity are rule-governed.
For the Background, however, Searle rejects the notion of rule-governance as too
intentional. As mentioned above, the Background is the mechanism by which functions
are ascribed to institutional facts non-intentionally. When behavior is rule-governed, the
semantic content of the rule is causally determining the behavior (Searle 1995, 139).
Searle’s example of speech acts makes it clear that this rule-governance can take place
when an agent’s behavior is caused by an “unconscious internalization of the rules,” but
this is still too intentional for the Background causal mechanism.65
The difﬁculties in assimilating the basic validity rule to the Background should now
be apparent. While the Background is an explanation of unconscious assignment of func-
tion, the basic validity rule must motivate a psychologically self-aware assignment of
function for ofﬁcials in its application. If the basic validity rule commands that validity
determinations be made in accord with a foundational document like a constitution, the
ofﬁcials must be self-aware when they apply the constitution to make their validity deter-
minations, even if they are not self-aware in applying a more basic validity rule directing
them to look to the constitution. The ofﬁcials might not be constantly self-aware of the
criteria by which they determine legality (that is, the semantic content of the basic valid-
ity rule), but they are still making that determination self-consciously. That determination
of legal validity is precisely the assignment of function Searle discusses. Certain
61 The description of the basic validity rule as a standing disposition might seem to buttress the claim that
it is a part of Searle’s Background since Searle uses dispositional language to explain the Background.
We will see, however, that the behavior that legal ofﬁcials engage in (the determination of legal validity)
as a result of these dispositions is too self-conscious and too foundational (in the assignment of function)
for these dispositions to be part of Searle’s Background.
62 Hence legal rules generally are not the kind of rules that are described by his practice theory (Hart, 1994,
256).
63
“To the rule of recognition viewed in this way[,] the practice theory of rules is fully applicable.” Ibid.
64 See above, n.60.
65
“If we think of the Background intentionalistically, then we have abandoned the thesis of the Back-
ground. We arrived at that thesis in the ﬁrst place only because we found that intentionality goes only so
far” (Searle, 1995, 140, denying that Background capacities like the rules of syntax can be understood as
rule-governed). See also especially Searle (2010, 31).
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statements “count as” law in certain contexts. Since the ofﬁcials are making the assign-
ment self-consciously and intentionally (even if the precise rules by which they do so are
not fully and clearly formed consciously), the assignment of legal validity, and the inter-
nalized rules governing it, cannot be an element of the Background.
Searle explicitly denies an internalized rules explanation for the Background (1995,
145-47), and concludes that cases of Background causation cannot be described as rule-
governed (1995, 140). For legal ofﬁcials, it is clear that their behavior in determining
legal validity is rule-governed, and that they have achieved any lack of self-awareness in
applying those rules by internalizing them as they underwent their legal training. There is
a right answer at which the ofﬁcials are aiming in their validity practices, and they
acknowledge mistakes as misapplications of their validity rules. Hence, while their accep-
tance (in Hart’s sense) still reﬂects a disposition to behave in conformity with the basic
validity rules, and while this seems to be a kind of “background ability” that is sugges-
tive of Searle’s analysis, the rule-governed, intentional, and conscious assignment of
functionality in determining legal validity precludes locating the basic validity rule in
Searle’s Background.
It might seem that this is just a problem of seeing the basic validity rule as a practice
theory rule in Hart’s sense and that a solution would be to reject the practice theory and
embrace Searle’s notion of the Background for basic validity rules. However, it would
not be enough for a legal positivist merely to reject the practice theory of rules for the
validity rule. In fact, Hart’s practice theory gets a lot closer to the Background than other
candidates for the basic validity rule. In order to square with Searle’s Background, a legal
positivist would have to give up on the idea that the basic validity rules are endorsed by
or guiding the behavior of ofﬁcials at all.
More recently, Searle has complicated the discussion by introducing notions of Back-
ground powers, which are norms that might come much closer to what we see with the
basic validity rule. These do appear to be more prone to be explained as a form of rule-
governance in that they set forth the content of those behavioral norms we might call
customary or cultural for a given society, although they are generally still unconscious.
They include, for example, forms of acceptable dress and speech, acceptable moral opin-
ions, and other basic behavioral norms (Searle 2010, 155). Violations of these norms will
typically be met with sanctions by other members of society, who will see violations as
outside the realm of acceptable behavior and respond with expressions of disapproval or
stronger censuring behavior (Searle 2010, 156-57).
There are two problems with this move for the basic validity rule. For one, Searle
explicitly excludes legal sanctions from the kinds of pressure brought to bear on viola-
tions of the Background social norms (2010, 157). Of course, violations of the basic
validity rule are not typically met with legal sanctions in the criminal or civil sense. If a
violation of the basic validity rule is a mistaken validity determination by an ofﬁcial, then
the usual response – a contrary declaration by ofﬁcials of superior jurisdiction – may not
count as a legal sanction. So, if we are narrow in our understanding of legal sanctions to
exclude being overruled or perhaps losing one’s job, then this might not be a problem.
The bigger problem is that Searle is clearly talking about a background set of cultural
norms that are enforceable by anyone and everyone (2010, 157). While ordinary citizens
can make use of the basic validity rule themselves to make personal decisions about
which laws they consider to be valid parts of the legal system they inhabit, their deci-
sions do not have any legal weight. The basic validity rule is not aimed at them; it is
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aimed at the ofﬁcials who are charged with making determinations of validity (Shapiro
2011, 85).
Perhaps the most promising way out of this difﬁculty, offering the hope of seeing the
basic validity rule as an element of Searle’s Background powers, is to see the ofﬁcials as
constituting a society unto themselves. This would be to say that the basic validity rule is
a Background norm of a special club that ofﬁcials belong to. The difﬁculty here is the
hierarchical way in which ofﬁcials are usually organized with respect to their validity
determinations. That is, since Searle’s Background powers are possessed and enforced by
everyone in society, there is a distributed and egalitarian character to their normativity
that we do not see in the way the basic validity rule is addressed to ofﬁcials. Even if we
imagine ofﬁcials at different levels of the legal hierarchy are equally important to the
maintenance of the system by their use of the basic validity rule, that rule is still giving
some ofﬁcials the role of making fresh validity determinations and others merely the role
of recognizing and applying the determinations made by others. One way out of this
would be to see the “society” with the basic validity rule qua Background power as only
consisting of those ofﬁcials empowered to make ultimate determinations of validity in a
given domain or jurisdiction. But as the basic validity rules are usually clearly aimed at
and deployed by a wider set of ofﬁcials, this move is artiﬁcial and runs counter to
observed legal practice.
6. A Suggested Solution
Might we say that the basic validity rule is constitutive of (legal) institutionality in the
same way we say that it is constitutive of validity? This would be to say that the basic
validity rule is the constitutive rule by which the function ‘law’ is assigned to the decla-
rations of legal ofﬁcials. Applying this idea to Searle’s “X counts as Y in context C” for-
mula, the ‘X’ term is the writings and pronouncements of legal ofﬁcials; the ‘Y’ term is
simply “law” or “legally valid”; the ‘C’ term is the context of the ofﬁcials’ roles and
duties (another institutional creation). The constitutive rule that assigns the ‘Y’ function
to the ‘X’ term is the basic validity rule. That certainly seems to ﬁt the analogous theo-
retical roles it plays in the two theories.
This shifts the focus of our discussion somewhat. No longer would we see a descrip-
tion of the ofﬁcials’ validity practices as the ‘X’ term and something like “our (binding)
criteria of validity” as the ‘Y’ term. That formulation generated the problem in the lack
of a constitutive rule that could be codiﬁed by which the ‘Y’ function was assigned to
the ‘X’ practice. In saying that the basic validity rule is itself only a constitutive rule but
still an institutional fact, we are saying that there is something special and foundational
about it, and perhaps similar foundational validity norms for institutionalized social prac-
tices.
This is an attractive solution but would require interposing an additional structure
within Searle’s theory, providing a place for foundational constitutive rules that set the
basic validity conditions for what might be called “institutional systems” like law. While
Searle does provide for what might be called foundational institutional facts, he reserves
that special role for language itself (1995, 60, 72-73), performing its symbolization func-
tion (1995, 60-61, 66). The details of this make it clear that it would not be directly
available for the much less foundational notion of the basic validity rule of a legal sys-
tem. Since symbolization itself is the function of language, we identify certain sounds
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and groups of letters as instances of symbolization by linking the realization that thoughts
represent and symbolize objects to the realization that language is the medium for doing
so. To be such a foundational and self-identifying institutional fact is not to have the
ascription of function set by a constitutive rule.
To entertain the possibility that the basic validity rule ﬁts this description at a less
foundational level, we would have to see it as self-identifying and not ﬁxed by a consti-
tutive rule, while it serves as the constitutive rule for generating the institution it vali-
dates. If we can interpose this additional intermediate foundation (not as basic as
language), then the onus would be back on the legal theorists to ﬁll in the blanks.66
There is something that remains mysterious about the way in which the mere description
of other ofﬁcials’ validity practices becomes a reason for action in conformity with those
practices. Hart is content to rest upon the ofﬁcials’ consideration of the practices as rea-
son-giving, which they internalize in seeing it as a basis for criticism, doing so for a wide
variety of possibly personal reasons (1994, 55-57, 83-91, 108, 203). But if we can say
that the basic validity rule is self-identifying in that the very description of ofﬁcials’
validity practices somehow carries with it the demand for conformity, then we would not
expect it to be ﬁxed by constitutive rule. It would itself be the foundational constitutive
rule for the institution of law and a search for its constitutive rule would be as misplaced
as the question of whether it is legally valid.67
While this does not entirely solve the problem of explaining legal normativity, it at
least helps us to narrow down the issue by showing that legal normativity arises out of
the demand for conformity that is carried by the basic validity rule as a self-identifying
constitutive rule. Whatever makes the basic validity rule binding upon ofﬁcials is then
also the source of legal normativity more widely. It certainly seems reasonable to say that
ofﬁcials are under a legal duty to adhere to the basic validity rule in their determinations
of validity. Since that rule then determines which other legal norms are legally valid, it
gives the ofﬁcials the deontic power to impose novel legal norms in conformity with its
dictates, transmitting normativity to the legal requirements they create and apply.
7. Conclusion
The basic validity rule that sets forth the criteria by which the elements of a legal system
are to be recognized as valid cannot ﬁt neatly into Searle’s picture of institutional reality.
It must be an institutional fact rather than a simple social fact because the rule counts as
something more than the bare fact of the validity practices of ofﬁcials. It now carries a
demand for compliance by legal ofﬁcials. The description has become a reason to behave
in certain ways.
It cannot be merely an informal institutional fact because it is a standard by which
other validity decisions can be deemed incorrect (a standard by which counterfeit
instances can be recognized). Furthermore, it is not ﬂexible and spontaneous, characteris-
tics of informal institutions. Yet it cannot be a formal institutional fact because it cannot
be codiﬁed in Searle’s sense. There is rarely any self-aware ofﬁcial recognition of its
66 One possible answer to this challenge (although not made in response to such an alteration of Searle’s
theory) is suggested by Marmor’s notions of “deep conventions” (2006a, 363-71; 2007, passim).
67 For an analysis of the relation of the validity practices to the ofﬁcials’ reasons for accepting them as
binding, see Dickson (2007, 4-9).
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status. We do not see ofﬁcial ﬁxation of the characteristics of its type by which we could
decide which among token candidate basic validity rules are valid. (It is constitutive of
legal validity itself.) There is no constitutive rule by which the validity practices of ofﬁ-
cials are deemed to function as normatively binding. Finally, there is no ofﬁcial, explicit
act institutionalizing the basic validity rule.
This leaves us in a conundrum when trying to understand law from within Searle’s
institutional framework. One possible solution is to interpose a new class of foundational
facts for institutional systems. One result of this would be to refocus the jurisprudential
quest on explaining how descriptions of ofﬁcials’ validity practices carry a demand for
conformity, which is really at the root of the questions about what (if anything) legiti-
mates legal authority.68
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